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FEDERAL TAX LAW-MuLLIKIN v. UNITED STATES'. "BIG 
BROTHER" Is STILL WATCHING; THE IRS CAN ASSESS PENALTIES 
AT ANY TIME 
INTRODUCTION 
In Mullikin v. United States,l the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit addressed a case of first impression. That issue and 
the subject of this Note is whether the statute of limitations estab­
lished in title 28, section 2462 of the United States Code applies to 
penalty assessments made under the authority of section 6701 of the 
Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.2 The Internal Rev­
enue Service assessed penalties against Mullikin, an accountant, for 
aiding and abetting the understatement of taxes for his client, 
1. 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). 
2. The Tax & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 615 (1982) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6701 (1982» (current version at 26 U.S.c. § 6701 (1988 & Supp. 
IV 1992». There was a second issue raised in Mullikin. The court was also asked to 
address the issue of whether the district court erred in only allowing the Internal Reve­
nue Service to assess one penalty per calendar year against Mullikin. Mullikin, 952 F.2d 
at 930. The district court held the IRS was not entitled to assess penalties for each 
quarter of the calendar year even though Mullikin had prepared and filed the returns 
for his client quarterly instead of yearly. Mullikin v. United States, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) 85,304, 85,306-08 (E.D. Ky. 1990), rev'd, 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. de­
nied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). The district court interpreted the words "taxable period" in 
26 U.S.C. § 6701(b)(3) to mean calendar year. [d. Therefore, the IRS could only assess 
penalties for each year. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Mullikin v. United States, 952 
F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). The court held that Congress 
intended the words "taxable period" to permit quarterly tax penalty assessments if the 
returns were filed quarterly, instead of yearly. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 931. However, 
because the facts in Mullikin are easily distinguishable from the facts of cases offering a 
different interpretation of "taxable period," and the dissent in Mullikin agreed with the 
majority's reasoning on the interpretation of "taxable period," this Note will not ad­
dress the issue of the proper interpretation of "taxable period" under § 6701(b)(3). 26 
U.S.C. § 6701(b)(3) (1982),(current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6701(b)(3) (1988». 
The court's interpretation of "taxable period" is, however, divergent from other 
circuit court cases addressing the same issue. See, e.g., Mattingly v. United States, 924 
F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that "taxable period" means calendar year); Emanuel 
v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. III. 1989) (interpreting that the phrase "taxable 
period" refers to calendar year). Both cases involved situations where the tax preparer 
had amended returns which referred to annual, not quarterly, returns previously filed. 
But in Mullikin, the quarterly returns did not reference any annual return. Mullikin, 
952 F.2d at 931. The Mullikin court found this fact dispositive and held Mullikin liable 
for penalties for each quarterly return filed during the years in question. [d. 
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Vanco International, Inc.3 The penalties were assessed more than 
six years after the infractions occurred. Because there is no express 
limitations period enunciated in the text of section 6701,4 the court 
held that no statute of limitations applied to the federal government 
because the IRS was enforcing an anti-fraud provision of the Inter­
nal Revenue Code.s This holding may have far reaching implica­
tions for all penalty actions initiated by the federal government 
because the holding suggests that no time limitation is imposed on 
the government to assess penalties, even in nontax related disputes. 
Section One of this Note will examine the factual background 
of the dispute and the legislative history of title 28, section 2462 of 
the United States Code and title 26, section 6701 of the United 
States Code. Section One will also discuss the case law precedent 
of the United States Supreme Court which the United States Dis-· 
trict Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky and Court of Ap­
peals for the Sixth Circuit used in deciding the issue presented in 
Mullikin. Section Two will discuss the principal case, Mullikin, 
from its disposition at the district court level as well as at the appel­
late court level. Section Two will also examine the legal reasoning 
of the majority in reaching its conclusion and the dissent's objec­
tions to the majority's reasoning. Section Three will analyze the 
holding and argue that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
incorrectly interpreted section 2462 and the legislative history be­
hind section 6701. Section Three will also show that other federal 
courts have applied section 2462 differently in factual situations 
similar to that presented in Mullikin. Finally, this Note will show 
that the majority in Mullikin incorrectly decided the case because it 
failed to apply a relevant statutory provision to its legal analysis. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Setting 
James Mullikin was an accountant who prepared tax returns 
during the years of 1982 and 1983.6 Mullikin prepared eight quar­
terly employment tax returns for Vanco International, Inc. for the 
fiscal years of 1982 and 1983.7 Mullikin also provided additional 
3. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 921. 
4. 26 U.S.c. § 6701 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6701 (1988 & Supp. IV 
1992» (originally enacted as part of the Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 
Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 615 (1982». See infra note 10 for the text of 26 U.S.c. § 6701. 
5. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 929. 
6. Id. at 921. 
7. Id. 
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financial services to Vanco by preparing nine Wage and Tax state­
ments ("W-2 Forms") for Vanco's employees for 1982 returns, and 
preparing ten such forms for 1983 returns.s The W-2 Forms omitted 
cash wages paid to Vanco employees, which caused the understate­
ment of the employees' tax liabilities.9 
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") later determined that 
Mullikin's failure to include the cash wages on the W-2 Forms con­
stituted the aiding and abetting of an understatement of tax liability 
in violation of title 26, section 6701 of the United States Code.IO 
Mullikin paid the required amount of the penalty and subsequently 
followed the assessment challenge procedurell to request a refund 
for the amounts already paid.12 The IRS denied one of Mullikin's 
requests for a refund and failed to address the second claim within 
the time allotted by the Internal Revenue Code.13 Mullikin then 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 26 U.S.c. § 6701 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.c. § 6701 (1988 & 
Supp. IV 1992» (originally enacted as part of the Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 615 (1982» states, in relevant part: 
(a) Imposition of Penalty. Any person­
(1) who aids or assists in, procures, or advises with respect to, the preparation 
or presentation of any portion of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document 
in connection with any matter arising under the internal revenue laws, 
(2) who knows that such portion will be used in connection with any material 
matter arising under the internal revenue laws, and 
(3) who knows that such portion (if so used) will result in an understatement 
of the liability for tax of another person, shall pay a penalty with respect to 
each such document. ... 
Id. 
11. 26 U.S.c. § 6703(c)(I) and (2) (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6701(c)(1) and (2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992» (originally enacted as part of the Tax 
Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97·248, 96 Stat. 613 (1982» states: 
(1) If, within 30 days after the day on which notice and demand of any penalty 
under section 6700, 6701, or 6702 is made against any person, such person pays 
an amount which is not less than 15 percent of the amount of such penalty and 
files a claim for refund of the amount so paid, no levy or proceeding in court 
for the collection of the remainder of such penalty shall be made, begun, or 
prosecuted until the final resolution of a proceeding begun as provided in par­
agraph (2) .... 
(2) If, within 30 days after the day on which his claim for refund of any partial 
payment of any penalty under section 6700, 6701, or 6702 is denied ... the 
person fails to begin a proceeding in the appropriate United States district 
court for the determination of his liability for such penalty, paragraph (1) shall 
cease to apply .... 
Id. Mullikin complied with these statutory provisions by paying fifteen percent of the 
total $99,000 in penalty assessments. Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 921 (6th 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). 
12. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 921. 
13. [d. Section 6703(c)(2) requires the IRS to rule on a taxpayer's request for a 
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filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Kentucky to obtain a refund of the penalty assessment portions 
he had already paid, claiming that the limitations period in title 28, 
section 2462 of the United States Code barred the IRS from assess­
ing penalties after five years.14 However, to fully understand Mulli­
kin's dispute with the IRS, it is necessary to briefly examine the 
language and purpose of title 26, section 6701 of the United States 
Code and title 28, section 2462 of the United States Code. 
B. 	 Statutory Basis for Mullikin's Conflict with the IRS 
1. 	 Brief History of Title 26, Section 6701 of the United 
States Code 
Congress enacted section 6701, as part of the Tax Equity & 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. Section 6701 basically provides 
that any person who aids or assists in preparing tax returns that 
understate the taxpayer's tax liability, and knows the tax returns 
will understate the taxpayer's liability, is subject to a civil fine. Is 
Until section 6701 was enacted, criminal charges were the only rem­
edy available to the IRS to prevent tax preparers from intentionally 
understating their client's tax liabilities.16 
The Senate Finance Committee gave four reasons why it was 
necessary to create a new civil penalty to enforce the restrictions 
against aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liabilityP 
The first reason the Senate Finance Committee gave was that a civil 
penalty would discourage those who would otherwise assist taxpay­
ers in fraudulently understating their tax liability.18 Next, the Com­
mittee cited the inequity of subjecting taxpayers to large civil 
penalties for underpaying taxes, while allowing their tax preparers 
refund within six months and thirty days after the taxpayer files a request. 26 U.S.c. 
§ 6703(c)(2) (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.c. § 6703(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». 
The IRS failed to rule on Mullikin's second claim within the statutory time allotted. 
Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 921. Pursuant to provisions. established in § 6703(c)(2), Mullikin 
filed a timely proceeding in the United States District Court of Kentucky for a determi­
nation of his liability on his first refund claim. Id. at 921-22. 
14. 	 Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 921-22. 
15. 26 U.S.C. § 6701 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.c. § 6701 (1988 & Supp. IV 
1992». See supra note 10 for text of 26 U.S.C. § 6701(a)(1)-(3). A violation of § 6701 
results in a fine of $1,000 per violation. 26 U.S.c. § 6701(b)(1) (1982) (current version 
at 26 U.S.c. § 6701(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992» (originally enacted as part of the Tax 
Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 615 (1982». 
16. 	 S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
V.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1022. 
17. 	 [d. 
18. 	 Id. 
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to escape any civil fine. 19 The third justification was that a civil 
penalty would be more appropriate than criminal proceedings since 
the act of assisting others to understate taxes is culpable, but not 
worthy of criminal prosecution.20 Finally, the Committee believed 
that a civil penalty would help protect innocent taxpayers who are 
falsely misled by advisors and tax preparers seeking to make a 
profit at the taxpayer's expense.21 
However, in its report, the Senate Finance Committee did not 
address the significance of the omission in section 6701 of an ex­
press limitations period on the assessment of penalties. Mullikin 
argued that the omission of a limitations period in section 6701 indi­
cated that Congress intended the limitations period established in 
section 2462 to apply.22 Therefore, it is necessary to briefly study 
the language and purpose of title 28, section 2462 of the United 
States Code to understand Mullikin's argument as to why section 
2462 applies to section 6701 cases. 
2. 	 Legislative History of Title 28, Section 2462 of the 
United States Code 
For nearly two centuries, section 2462 and its predecessors 
have provided a catch-all statute of limitations that applies to cer­
tain actions initiated by the federal govemment.23 The origins of 
the present version of title 28, section 2462 of the United States 
Code date back to the Judiciary Act of 1799.24 In the Judiciary Act 
of 1799, Congress moved away from the rule of sovereign immunity 
and subjected the federal government to statutory limitations peri­
ods. The language of the statute of limitations has changed over the 
years, but the basic purpose of maintaining an equitable system of 
government has remained the same. Congress did not want citizens 
to be subjected to the inconvenience of unwarranted and untimely 
law suits instigated by the government.25 Title 28, section 2462 of 
the United States Code states: 
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit 
19. 	 Id. 
20. 	 Id. 
21. 	 Id. 
22. Mullikin v. United States, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), 85,304, 85,304-06 (E.D. 
Ky. 1990), rev'd, 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). 
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1978) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988 & Supp. IV 
1992» (originally Pub. L. 80-773, 62 Stat. 974 (1948». 
24. 	 Judiciary Act of 1799, ch. 22, § 89, 1 Stat. 695 (1799). 
25. 	 Id. 
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or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or 
forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless 
commenced within five years from the date when the claim first . 
accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is 
found within the United States in order that proper service may 
be made thereon.26 
The significance of both sections 6701 and 2462 in Mullikin is 
twofold. First, Mullikin was the first successful attempt, at the 
lower court level, to use section 2462 to bar the IRS from assessing 
penalties because the time period had expired.27 Second, the Mulli­
kin court was forced to weigh the IRS's need to enforce anti-fraud 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code against the taxpayer's in­
terest in being free from governmental interference after a reason­
able amount of time had passed. However, to comprehend 
Mullikin's dispute with the IRS, it is necessary to examine the de­
velopment of the doctrines and case law that have defined statute 
of limitation law as it applies to the federal government. 
C. United States Supreme Court Precedent 
1. E.l. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Davis28 
E.l. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. involved a situation where the 
United States had taken control of the nation's railroads and was 
seeking to recover charges from the defendant that had accrued on 
shipments of cotton under the Transportation Act of 1920.29 The 
district court sustained a demurrer by the defendant on the grounds 
that the action was time-barred by section 424 of the Transportation 
Act.30 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed,31 and 
the United States Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's de­
cision. The Court held that the United States was acting in its gov­
ernmental capacity, and therefore was not subject to any statute of 
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1978) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988 & Supp. IV 
1992» (originally Pub. L. 80-773, 62 Stat. 974 (1948». 
27. Mullikin v. United States, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), 85,304, 85,306 (E.D. Ky. 
1990), rev'd, 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). 
28. 264 U.S. 456 (1924). 
29. [d. at 459. 
30. [d. The relevant language stated, "(3) All actions at law by carriers subject to 
this Act for recovery of their charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun within three 
years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after." Id. (quoting the Trans­
portation Act of 1920 § 424, 41 Stat. 459,492 (1920». 
31. Davis v. E.!. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 287 F. 522 (1923), affd, 264 U.S. 
456 (1924). 
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limitations unless Congress expressly enacted one.32 
The Court in E.!. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. noted that there 
were five titles in the Transportation Act of 1920, none of which 
made reference to a statute of limitations that would apply against 
the federal government.33 The Court, unable to find a time restric­
tion on the federal government, interpreted this omission to mean 
that Congress intended no statute of limitations to apply.34 The 
Court reasoned that if Congress wanted a statute of limitations to 
apply to the Act, Congress would have specifically placed such a 
provision into the Act.35 The Court thus concluded that there was 
no specific time restriction established in the Act, and therefore the 
United States was not subject to any statute of limitations.36 
2. Badaracco v. Commissioner37 
In Badaracco, a taxpayer initially filed a fraudulent tax return, 
then later filed an accurate, amended return.38 Except in cases of 
fraud, the Internal Revenue Code generally provides for a three 
year limitations period in section 6501(a), in which the IRS may 
initiate legal proceedings against a taxpayer.39 The issue before the 
Court was whether the general three year statute of limitations of 
the Internal Revenue Code40 would allow penalty assessments after 
the time period had expired.41 The Court held that the general 
three year statute of limitations established in section 6501(a) did 
not apply.42 
32. E.!. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 264 U.S. at 462. 
33. [d. 
34. Id. at 461. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 461-62. 
37. 464 U.S. 386 (1984). 
38. Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 389. 
39. 26 U.S.c. § 6501(a) (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) (1988 & 
Supp. IV 1992». See infra note 40 for text of the Internal Revenue Code's three year 
statute of limitations, 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a). 
40. [d. Section 6501(a) provides in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed 
by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed (whether 
or not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed) or, if the tax is 
payable by stamp, at any time after such tax became due and before the expi­
ration of 3 years after the date on which any part of such tax was paid, and no 
proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such tax shall be 
begun after the expiration of such period. 
[d. 
41. Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 388. 
42. Id. at 397. 
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The Court in Badaracco reasoned that the plain language in 
section 6501(c)(1) expressly stated that no statute of limitations was 
to apply if a return was filed fraudulently.43 The Court then reas­
serted its position articulated in E.1. Du Pont De Nemours that stat­
utes of limitation barring the collection of taxes otherwise due and 
unpaid are strictly construed in favor of the government.44 Thus, 
the Court did not find that the defendant's amended and accurate 
return could toll the statute of limitations, because the plain lan­
guage of the statute indicated that no limitations period was to ap­
ply when a fraudulent return is filed.45 However, there is 
conflicting United States Supreme Court precedent that indicates 
taxpayers should be favored in tax cases. 
3. 	 Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage CO.46 and 
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co. 47 
Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co. involved a tax­
payer who paid his taxes and, nearly five years later, was assessed 
additional income and profit taxes.48 The taxpayer refused to pay 
the additional taxes.49 In ruling that the IRS illegally sold the tax­
payer's property to pay the tax deficiency,50 the United States 
Supreme Court held that provisions of taxing statutes are to be in­
terpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayer.51 
In an even more sweeping decision, Rothensies v. Electric Stor
43. 	 Id. at 395-96 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(I) (1982» (current version at 26 
U.S.c. § 6501(c)(I) (1988». Badaracco argued the fraudulent return was a "nullity," 
therefore only the amended, non-fraudulent return should commence the limitations 
period. Id. at 396. The Court expressly rejected the taxpayer's argument, holding that 
the plain language of § 6501(a) referenced the original return, not the amended return. 
Id. 
44. Id. at 391 (citing E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456 
(1924». 
45. Id. at 396. However, one commentator has provided an extensive, critical 
analysis of the reasoning in Badaracco. Douglas A. Kahn, The Supreme Court's Mis­
construction of a Procedural Statute· A Critique of the Court's Decision in Badaracco, 
82 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1983-84). The author uses logical reasoning and statutory inter­
pretation to suggest the .result achieved by the United States Supreme Court in Bada
racco was erroneous. Id. For a view supporting the holding of Badaracco, see Preston 
Rutledge, Note, Amended Returns and the Limitations Period for Tax Fraud, 51 OEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 600 (1983). 
46. 	 273 U.S. 346 (1927). 
47. 	 329 U.S. 296 (1946). 
48. 	 Bowers, 273 U.S. 346, 347 (1927). 
49. 	 Id. at 347. 
50. 	 Id. at 352. 
51. [d. at 350 (citing Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578, 583 (1902); Shwab v. 
Doyle, 258 U.S. 529, 536 (1922». 
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age Battery Co. ,52 the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of limitation periods on the actual assessment of taxes.53 In 
Rothensies, the Electric Storage Battery Company paid excise taxes 
to the government over a period of several years.54 The company 
later found it had unnecessarily paid the·tax. The taxpayer filed suit 
for a refund and received a settlement from the IRS, but the com­
pany had been deducting the amount it anticipated receiving from 
the IRS as a business deduction before the settlement.55 The IRS 
treated the amount deducted as income to the taxpayer and as­
sessed a deficiency against the taxpayer. The taxpayer paid the de­
ficiency, and then sued to recover the deficiency assessment.56 
In ruling that the taxpayer was allowed to recover the defi­
ciency, the United States Supreme Court held that an income tax 
system must have a final date of reckoning upon which the taxpayer 
would be free from government intrusion. 57 The Court believed 
that time limitations against the IRS's ability to assess taxes were 
beneficial because the limitations prevented the revival of stale 
claims and provided for swift, efficient justice. 58 Thus, the court in 
Mullikin v. United States could choose from either of the competing 
doctrines represented by Bowers and Rothensies. 
II. DISCUSSION OF MULLIKIN V. UNITED STATES 
A. 	 Disposition by the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky 
Before the district court, Mullikin argued that the penalty as­
sessments against him were time-barred because of the statute of 
limitations established in title 28, section 2462 of the United States 
Code.59 Mullikin contended that because no specific statute of limi­
tations was established in section 6701, the statute of limitations 
provided in section 2462 applied by default.60 Both Mullikin and 
the IRS moved for summary judgment on the statute of limitations 
issue. 
52. 329 u.s. 296 (1946). 
53. Id. at 297. 
54. Id. at 298. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 301. 
58. Id. 
59. Mullikin v. United States, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), 85,304, 85,304-05 (E.D. 
Ky. 1990), rev'd, 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). 
60. Id. 
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The IRS argued that where Congress has not established a spe­
cific statute of limitations to apply to actions commenced by the 
government, courts are not at liberty to impose one.61 The IRS 
contended that "statutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar 
rights of the Government must receive a strict construction in favor 
of the Government."62 The IRS used Badaracco63 to argue that it 
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
The district court agreed with Mullikin's argument and granted 
his motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations is­
sue.64 The IRS appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit.65 
B. 	 The Majority Opinion for the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit 
On appeal, the Mullikin majority noted the particular issue of 
the applicability of the section 2462 statute of limitations to section 
6701 penalties was one of first impression.66 The IRS advanced two 
primary arguments. First, it argued that section 6701 did not pro­
vide a limitations period and therefore no statute of limitations ap­
plied to the assessment of penalties under section 6701.67 The IRS 
buttressed this argument by noting the general rule that statutes of 
limitation applied against the government must be interpreted 
strictly in favor of the government.68 The IRS, therefore, concluded 
that no statute of limitations should apply to penalty assessments 
under section 6701, and thus, penalties levied under section 6701 
61. 	 [d. at 85,306. 
62. 	 [d. (quoting Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984». 
63. 	 Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386 (1984). 
64. 	 Mullikin, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 85,307. 
65. Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
85 (1992). Following the district court's decision in Mullikin, another taxpayer success­
fully used § 2462 to bar penalty assessments made under § 6701 of the Internal Reve­
nue Code. Lamb v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Ark. 1991), rev'd, 977 F.2d 
1296 (8th Cir. 1992). Lamb was a tax preparer who was assessed penalties under § 6701 
for understating eight clients' tax returns. Id. at 116-17. The Lamb court found the 
policy reasons in Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946), and 
the logical reasoning of Mullikin v. United States, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), 85,304 
(E.D. Ky. 1990) persuasive, and ruled the penalty assessments were time-barred. 
Lamb, 779 F. Supp. 118-19. However, the Lamb decision occurred before the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decision reversed the district court's decision in Mullikin, 
and has subsequently been reversed itself. See Lamb, 779 F. Supp. 116, rev'd, 977 F.2d 
1296. 
66. 	 Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 926. 
67. 	 [d. at 925. 
68. 	 [d.; see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
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could be assessed at any time.69 
The IRS's second argument was that a penalty "assessment" 
was not an action, suit, or proceeding for the enforcement of a civil 
penalty because "assessment" was not specifically mentioned in sec­
tion 2462; therefore, it was outside the definitional reach of section 
2462.70 The IRS contended that "assessment" under section 2462 
was merely an "administrative act."71 Finally, the IRS directed the 
court's attention to section 6502, arguing that section 6502 provides 
a penalty may be assessed at any time, but an action to enforce a 
penalty following the assessment must be brought within six years,72 
Since Mullikin was a penalty assessment case, and not an enforce­
ment case, the IRS should be allowed to assess penalties at any 
time. 
Mullikin, in tum, reasserted his successful argument used in 
the district court. Mullikin contended that title 28, section 2462 of 
the United States Code provides a catch-all statute of limitations 
that is applicable to any governmental attempt to collect penal­
ties.73 Mullikin argued that the only exception to section 2462 is 
where Congress has otherwise specifically provided for a limitations 
period, which is not the case with section 6701,74 Thus, Mullikin 
asserted that Congress intended section 2462 to apply to any gov­
ernment "proceeding," including administrative actions and judicial 
proceedings to enforce statutory penalties.75 Therefore, he argued, 
the penalty assessments for the 1982 tax returns were time-barred 
because the IRS did not initiate any proceeding until the limitations 
period established in section 2462 had expired,76 However, the ma­
jority for the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected Mulli­
69. [d. 
70. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 26 for the text of § 2462. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. at 925-26. See 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a) (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.c. 
§ 6502(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992» which provides: 
(a) Where the assessment of any tax imposed by this title has been made 
within the period of limitation properly applicable thereto, such tax may be 
collected by levy or by a proceeding in court, but only if the levy is made or 
the proceeding begun- . 
(1) within 6 years after the assessment of the tax .... 
Id. For similar time limitations on IRS court proceedings, but not on assessments, see 
supra note 40 for text of 26 U.S.C. § 6501 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.c. § 6501 et 
seq. (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». Under the current version of 26 U.S.C. § 6501, the time 
limitation is ten years, not three. [d. 
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kin's argument and reversed the district court's ruling.77 
The majority in Mullikin agreed with the IRS and followed the 
general rule established by the United States Supreme Court in E.!. 
Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Davis78 that "[a]n action on behalf 
of the United States in its governmental capacity ... is subject to no 
time limitation, in the absence of congressional enactment clearly 
imposing it."79 
The majority in Mullikin also followed the rule articulated in 
Badaracco,80 stating that where a statute of limitations seeks to bar 
the United States from acting in its governmental capacity, the stat­
ute must receive strict construction in favor of the government.8l 
Since the issue of whether section 2462 applied to penalty assess­
ments was an issue of first impression, the Mullikin majority had no' 
binding precedent on which to base its decision. Section 6501 of the 
Internal Revenue Code is a general three year limitations period 
that applies to all actions commenced by the IRS, unless a specific 
Internal Revenue Code provision provides differently.82 Therefore, 
the Mullikin majority was forced to analogize federal cases that ad­
dressed the issue of whether the limitations period for the assess­
ment and collection of taxes established in section 6501 applied to 
penalties assessed under sections 6700 or 6701 to determine which, 
if any, limitations period applied to section 6701.83 
The Mullikin majority examined one court of appeals case and 
several district court cases which held that penalty assessments lev­
ied under either section 6700 or section 6701 were not subject to the 
statute of limitations established in section 6501.84 The Mullikin 
majority found these cases to be persuasive and adopted much of 
77. [d. at 929. 
78. 264 U.S. 456 (1924). 
79. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 926 (quoting E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 
264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924». 
80. Id. at 926 (citing Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984». 
81. [d. 
82. 26 U.S.c. § 6501(a) (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.c. § 6501(a) (1988 & 
Supp. IV 1992»; see also supra note 40 for text of 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a). 
83. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 926. 
84. [d. (citing Sage v. United States, 908 F.2d 18, 25 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding the 
common law doctrine of laches is the only time bar to actions instituted by the govern­
ment, when Congress has not specifically established a statute of limitations»; Emanuel 
v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 434, 436 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that penalties assessed 
under both § 6700 and § 6701 were not subject to the three year statute of limitations in 
§ 6501); Agbanc, Ltd. v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Ariz. 1988) (holding 
§ 6501(a) is inapplicable to § 6700 penalties); Kuchan v. United States, 679 F. Supp. 764, 
768 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding § 6701 was enacted to combat fraud and therefore Con­
gress did not intend § 6501(a) to apply). 
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their reasoning, despite the fact the cases were not directly on 
point. The cases, which the Mullikin majority used as persuasive 
authority, dealt with the issue of whether the general Internal Rev­
enue Code statute of limitations in section 6501 applied to penalty 
assessments, whereas the issue in Mullikin was whether the general 
federal catch-all statute of limitations85 applied to penalty assess­
ments levied under the authority of the Internal Revenue Code. 
The majority drew an analogy between the issue in Mullikin and 
the legal analysis in Sage v. United States86 and Kuchan v. United 
States87 and concluded that section 2462 did not apply to penalties 
assessed under section 6701.88 
In Sage, the defendant, John Sage, was charged with selling al­
legedly abusive tax shelters.89 The defendant argued that the limi­
tations period established in section 6501(a) barred any penalty 
assessed under section 6700.90 Sage contended that the language of 
section 6671(a)91 states a penalty shall be assessed and collected in 
the same manner as taxes.92 Therefore, Sage argued, the statute of 
limitations, as it applied to the assessment and collection of taxes, 
must also be applied in the same manner to assessment of penal­
ties.93 Because the penalty assessment was made at a point in time 
past the three year limitations period in section 6501(a), Sage as­
serted that the proceedings by the IRS were time-barred.94 
In Sage, the IRS based its counter argument on the Badaracco 
holding, arguing that the "[s]tatutes of limitations must receive a 
strict construction in favor of the government."95 Thus, the IRS 
wanted the court to interpret section 6501(a) strictly. The IRS em­
phasized the plain language of section 6501(a), which "sets up the 
85. 28 v.s.c. § 2462 (1988). 
86. 908 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1990). 
87. 679 F. Supp. 764 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
88. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 928. 
89. Sage, 908 F.2d at 20. 
90. Id. at 23. 
91. 26 V.S.c. § 6671(a) (1988) states: 
The penalties and liabilities provided by this subchapter shall be paid upon 
notice and demand by the Secretary, and shall be assessed and collected in the 
same manner as taxes. Except as otherwise provided, any reference in this 
title to "tax" imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to the penalties 
and liabilities provided by this subchapter. 
Id. 
92. Sage, 908 F.2d at 23. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 24 (citing Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 V.S. 386 (1984)). 
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filing of a tax return as a prerequisite to the running of the limita­
tions period."96 This filing requirement of section 6501(a) was the 
dispositive factor to the IRS because section 6501(a) only applies if 
the taxpayer filed a return.97 Penalties assessed under section 6700, 
conversely, do not have a filing requirement.98 Therefore, the IRS 
argued, that the general three year statute of limitations articulated 
in section 6501(a) does not apply to penalties assessed pursuant to 
section 6700.99 
The court in Sage agreed with the IRS and concluded that a 
section 6700 assessment of penalties does not depend on the filing 
of a tax return.1oo The court noted that, if Sage's argument was 
adopted, it would be extremely difficult to determine when the limi­
tation period should begin to run, "i.e., when the prohibited activity 
took place or when the IRS became aware of the prohibited activ­
ity."101 The Sage court adopted the IRS's position that no statute 
of limitations is to apply to section 6700 penalties,102 reasoning that 
there is no specific language in section 6700 or elsewhere in the 
Code which "cuts down the power of [s]ection 6700."103 The court 
opined that the intent of Congress when enacting section 6700 was 
to prevent transactional fraud. 104 Therefore, the Sage court con­
cluded that Congress did not intend to have a statute of limitations 
apply to section 6700105 and noted that the only option available to 
a taxpayer when attempting to time-bar a claim by the government 
was the doctrine of laches.106 
The Mullikin majority then examined Kuchan v. United 
States,107 a district court case. In Kuchan, the IRS assessed penal­
ties pursuant to section 6701 against the defendant accountant for 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 25 (citing Agbanc, Inc. v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 423 (D. Ariz. 
1988». 
98. Id. 
99. Id. (quoting Agbanc, Inc. v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 423,426-27 (D. Ariz. 
1988». 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 25. 
102. Id. at 24. 
103. Id. at 25. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. "Laches" is the doctrine in which failure to assert a right or cause of 
action within a reasonable amount of time results in a bar to that claim in a court of 
equity. BLACK'S LAW DlcrIONARY 875 (6th ed. 1990). 
107. 679 F. Supp. 764 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
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aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liability. lOS The IRS 
imposed the penalties on Kuchan because of statements in letters 
Kuchan wrote to his clients, which if used in computing income tax, 
would lead to the understatement of tax liability. Yet, the IRS im­
posed this penalty even though Kuchan did not prepare and file a 
tax return for his clients. lo9 Kuchan argued that the penalties were 
barred because of the three year statute of limitations expressed in 
section 6501(a).l10 However, the district court did not agree with 
Kuchan's argument. 
The Kuchan court adopted the IRS's position that section 
6501(a) required a filing of a tax return to initiate the statute of 
limitations, whereas section 6701 was silent as to filing tax re­
turns.111 Therefore, the court concluded that the three year limita­
tions period established in section 6501(a) could not be used to bar 
penalty assessments since section 6701 of the Internal Revenue 
Code had no filing requirement.11Z 
The holding in Kuchan is significant given the factual back­
ground of the case because the defendant did not file, or prepare, 
an income tax return.113 In Kuchan, it appeared that the court did 
not want to establish a rule as to when the statute of limitations 
would toll in cases where there was no tax return filed. The Kuchan 
court followed Badaracco and held that no statute of limitations 
applied. 114 The Kuchan court interpreted section 6701 as being 
similar to other sections in the Internal Revenue Code that were 
intended to combat fraud and allow unrestricted periods of 
limitation.lls 
The Mullikin majority found the reasoning in both Sage and 
Kuchan persuasive.116 The Mullikin majority concluded that these 
cases represented the position that Congress did not intend a limita­
tion period to apply to any fraud prevention Code section, includ­
ing section 6701.117 The majority noted that sections 6700 and 6701 
108. Id. at 766. 
109. Id. at 766-67. 
110. Id. at 767-68. 
111. Id. at 768. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 766-67. 
114. Id. at 768. 
115. Id.; see also infra note 120 for the text of Internal Revenue Code anti-fraud 
sections which supply express periods of limitation. 
116. Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 928 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 
S. Ct. 85 (1992). 
117. Id. 
196 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:181 
are anti-fraud provisions under which Congress has traditionally al­
lowed an unrestricted period of limitation.118 
In reaching its conclusion, the Mullikin majority placed its ini­
tial emphasis on the legislative history behind section 6701. The 
majority found that the legislative history showed that the section 
was intended as an anti-fraud measure, and as such, it should be 
interpreted in a similar manner as other anti-fraud provisions.1l9 
The Mullikin majority then reviewed other anti-fraud provi­
sions of the Internal Revenue Code and concluded that Congress 
had provided for unlimited periods for assessment of penalties 
under those provisions.120 The Mullikin majority concluded that ti­
tle 28, section 2462 of the United States Code by its express lan­
guage only applied where Congress has not already provided for a 
statute of limitations.121 In so concluding, the majority stated that 
Congress has expressly provided limitation periods in other sections 
of the Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, the omission of a limita­
tions period in section 6701 indicated Congressional intent to have 
no statute of limitations apply to section 6701.122 Thus, the Mulli­
kin majority held that section 2462 was inapplicable to penalty as­
sessments made pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code.123 
118. [d. 
119. [d. The court quoted the Senate report which indicated the legislative intent 
for § 6701. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1982), reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1022); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text for the 
text and a discussion of § 6701. 
120. [d. at 928 nn.14 & 15. The court examined two anti-fraud provisions which 
allowed for unlimited assessment periods. The two sections were 26 U.S.c. 
§§ 6501(c)(I) & (2) and 6696(d)(I). 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(I) & (2) (1982) (current ver­
sion in 26 U.S.c. § 6501(c)(I) & (2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992» states: 
(1) False return 

In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax 

may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be 

begun without assessment, at any time. 

(2) Willful attempt to evade tax 

In case of a willful attempt in any manner to defeat or evade tax imposed by 

this title ..., the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collec­

tion of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time. 

[d.; see 26 U.S.C. § 6696(d)(I); which allows for an unlimited assessment period when 
used in conjunction with a penalty assessed under § 6694(b). 26 U.S.c. 
§ 6696(d)(I)(1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6696(d)(I) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». 
This section states: "The amount of any penalty under ... section 6694(b), the penalty 
may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of the penalty may be begun 
without assessment, at any time." [d. 
121. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 929. 
122. [d. 
123. Id. 
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The majority made a distinction between a limitations period 
for the initial penalty assessment, where no time constraint exists, 
and a later action to collect penalties already assessed.t24 The Mul­
likin majority observed that section 6703125 made specific reference 
"to the suspension of the running of the period of limitations on 
collection provided in section 6502."126 The majority interpreted 
this specific reference to mean that Congress intended there to be a 
limitations period for initiation of actions for collection of penalties 
already assessed, but not on the initial penalty assessments 
themselves.127 
The majority concluded its reasoning on the statute of limita­
tions issue by recognizing that its decision followed the trend of 
other courts in allowing the IRS to combat fraud by permitting that 
an unlimited period exists to assess penalties. l28 The majority did 
not address the IRS's second argument, namely, that an assessment 
is purely an administrative act. By simply holding section 2462 in­
applicable, the Mullikin majority avoided deciding the difficult is­
sue of whether an assessment is purely an administrative act.129 
C. 	 The Dissenting Opinion for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
Although the majority noted that Mullikin's argument on the 
issue of whether section 2462 applied to penalty assessments had 
merit and was logically sound,13° the majority still ruled in favor of 
the IRS.B1 The dissent, however, found both Mullikin's argument 
and the district court's opinion persuasive. The dissent looked at 
the plain language of title 28, section 2462 of the United States 
Code and argued that the section provided for a catch-all limita­
tions period where the Code had not specifically allocated one.132 
124. 	 [d. 
125. 26 u.s.c. § 6703(c)(1) and (2) (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.c. 
§ 6703(c)(1) and (2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». Section 6703(c) establishes the applica­
ble rules to penalties established under § 6701. See supra note 11 for the text of 
§ 6703(c). 
126. 	 Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 929 (emphasis added). 
127. 	 [d. 
128. 	 Id. 
129. 	 [d. at 929-30, n.17. 
130. 	 [d. at 929. 
131. 	 [d. 
132. Id. at 933 (Boggs, J., concurring in the majority's definition of "taxable pe­
riod" and dissenting in the majority's refusal to apply the statute of limitations articu­
lated in 28 U.S.C. § 2462). See also supra note 2 for a discussion of the "taxable period" 
issue raised in Mullikin. 
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Although the dissent did not cite any cases133 to support its posi­
tion, the dissent formulated a logical argument based on the plain 
statutory language to support its conclusion that the IRS's penalty 
assessments were time-barred.134 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Daniel Boggs pointed out that 
the majority opinion went to great lengths to hold that "no statute 
of limitation should apply" given the factual background of the 
case.135 The dissent argued that the policy concerns the majority 
used to reach its conclusion136 were really just reasons that "simply 
demonstrate why Congress might have not enacted a specific stat­
ute of limitations for the section in question."137 
Judge Boggs argued that by enacting title 28, section 2462 of 
the United States Code, Congress provided a limitations period to 
apply in all actions initiated by the government. Judge Boggs 
viewed the plain language of section 2462 as an unqualified statute 
of limitation which is applicable in all sections of the United States 
Code.138 He analyzed the language in section 2462, noting that the 
section made no qualifying statement that tax or fraud situations 
were outside its reach.139 The only exception to section 2462 was 
where Congress had otherwise provided a limitations period. 
Therefore, the dissent concluded that Congress intended section 
2462 to be a catch-all provision, applicable to_section 6701 penal­
ties.140 The dissent found it difficult to agree with the majority's 
interpretation that section 2462, which by its own terms applies to 
133. This is a case of first impression, not only for the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, but also throughout all the circuits. Therefore, there are no court of ap­
peals cases directly on point for the dissent to cite as authority for its position. 
However, there was one district court case which supports the dissent's view. 
Lamb v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (granting summary judgment 
in favor of the taxpayer and barring penalty assessments under § 6701 because the plain 
language in the section cannot be ignored), rev'd, 977 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1992). Lamb 
was, however, subsequently overturned on the authority of Mullikin v. United States. 
Lamb v. United States, 977 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1992). 
134. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 933 (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
135. [d. 
136. Judge Boggs categorized the majority's policy argument as two separate poli­
cies. Judge Boggs cites the reasons as "(1) statutes of limitations against actions by the 
government are not usually favored; and, (2) statutes of limitations do not generally 
apply to sections combating fraud." Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 933 (Boggs, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
137. [d. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 2462 (1977) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992))). 
140. [d. 
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all proceedings initiated by the government, did not apply to a sec­
tion of the Internal Revenue Code which is silent as to a time 
limitation.141 
Judge Boggs noted that the majority's reasoning placed a great 
deal of weight on the treatment of other Code sections enacted to 
combat fraud. 142 For example, he noted that the majority con­
cluded that Congress did not intend a limitation on assessment peri­
ods in other Code sections, therefore Congress must not have 
intended a limitation period for section 6701.143 However, Judge 
Boggs illustrated that of the Internal Revenue Code sections that 
the majority cited to show that Congress did not intend a statute of 
limitation to apply to penalty assessments, each section expressly 
stated that no limitations period was to apply.144 He noted that, in 
contrast, section 6701 makes no specific reference to a limitations 
period. Judge Boggs interpreted the omission of any reference to a 
limitations period in section 6701 as indicative of Congress' intent 
to have section 2462 apply.145 
In a footnote, Judge Boggs addressed the majority's avoidance 
of defining whether an assessment is purely an administrative act.146 
He rejected the IRS's contention that an assessment was only an 
administrative act on the ground that the assessment is a prerequi­
site to commencing an action in court to enforce a civil penalty and, 
therefore, is really part of the entire proceeding.147 Judge Boggs 
noted that it was illogical for the IRS to contend that an assessment 
is outside the definitional reach of section 2462 since the penalty 
assessment was the proceeding which initiated the actions leading 
to the collection of the penalty.148 Therefore, he reasoned, it is only 
logical to conclude that the event which starts the progression to­
ward the collection of the penalty is itself part of the proceeding.149 
141. Id. Judge Boggs' exact words in disagreeing with the majority were strong. 
He called the majority's reasoning an "ingenious interpretation that what is clearly a 
'catch-all' statute does not in fact catch a clearly relevant section." Id. 
142. Id. 
143. See supra note 120 and accompanying text for a discussion of Internal Reve­
nue Code sections that make specific reference to limitation periods. 
144. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 933 (emphasis added). 
145. Id. Judge Boggs found it "ironic that the court refers ... to the concession 
by the IRS that 'Congress[ ] fail[ed] to include ... a statute of limitations' in § 6701, yet 
on the very next page it 'finds that Congress has otherwise provided for a statute of 
limitations'." Id. 
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The Mullikin majority based its conclusion on the governmen­
tal policy consideration of preventing fraud. The Mullikin dissent 
used statutory analysis to conclude that the IRS should be barred 
from assessing penalties after a· period of time allotted by statute. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erroneously decided the 
case because it failed to address relevant legislative history and 
United States Supreme Court precedent. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. 	 The Mullikin Court Erroneously Interpreted the Legislative 
History of Title 26, Section 6701 of the United States 
Code 
The Mullikin majority emphasized that the legislative history 
showed Congress intended not to have any statute of limitations 
apply to section 6701 disputes.15o However, in its report, the Senate 
Finance Committee did not address the significance of the omission 
of a statute of limitations in section 6701.151 The Mullikin majority 
interpreted the legislative history and the language of section 6701 
to mean that Congress did not want any statute of limitations to 
apply152 since section 6701 is silent on this issue, and the legislative 
history only refers to fraud prevention policy goals.153 
However, such an interpretation was not fully warranted.154 In 
150. [d. at 928. See also supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text for the Mulli­
kin majority's discussion of the Congressional purpose behind § 6701. 
151. 	 S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1022. See also supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of the legislative history of § 6701. 
152. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 928. See also supra notes 116-29 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the Mullikin majority's reasoning. 
153. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy 
considerations behind § 6701. 
154. Basic statutory interpretation rules generally require that revenue legislation 
be given a strict construction in favor of the citizen who is taxed. 3A NORMAN J. 
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 66.01 (5th ed. 1992). Even if courts do not give a 
favorable statutory interpretation to the taxpayer, these courts still hold that the inter­
pretation must be reasonable, without bias to either the government or taxpayer. [d. at 
66.02. There is a strong presumption that the legislature enacting the revenue laws 
knows of the pre-existing legislation that covers the relevant subject matter. [d. at 
66.03. 
"[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16,23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 
(5th Cir. 1972». Although § 6701 is a recent addition to the Internal Revenue Code, it 
is still an anti-fraud provision. 26 U.S.c. § 6701 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. 
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Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage CO.,1SS the United States 
Supreme Court held that provisions of taxing statutes are to be con­
strued favoring the taxpayer.1S6 Since section 6701 is part of the 
Internal Revenue Code, the section is a provision that is part of a 
taxing statute. As a taxing statute, according to the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Bowers, the taxpayer is entitled to a 
liberal construction of the statute. Because section 6701 is silent on 
the time limitation issue, statutory interpretation is necessary to de­
termine whether section 2462 should apply to penalty assessments 
under section 6701. 
A liberal construction of section 6701 would subject the section 
to the 5 year limitation period in section 2462 because section 6701 
"does not otherwise provide" for an explicit limitations period.1S7 
Congress enacted section 2462 in order to allow citizens to be free 
from arbitrary and untimely lawsuits filed against them by the gov­
ernment. The Mullikin majority failed to address this concern of 
the taxpayer. More importantly, the Mullikin majority conve­
niently ignored the argument advanced by the taxpayer in order to 
reach its conclusion.1ss Not only is it clear from the legislative his­
tory of section 2462 that Congress sought to impose time restraints 
on the federal government for penalty proceedings, but it is also 
clear that Congress believed statutes of limitations against the 
government are necessary for a just and efficient system of 
government.1S9 
§ 6701 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». See also supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. 
Unlike other anti-fraud provisions, § 6701 does not have an express provision making 
statutes of limitation inapplicable. 26 U.S.c. § 6701. Congress should be presumed to 
know of the other anti-fraud sections of the Internal Revenue Code which contain ex­
press waivers of limitation periods. SUTHERLAND, at 66.03. Therefore, under this logic, 
the omission by Congress of an express waiver of any statute of limitations should be 
construed as Congressional intent to have the catch-all statute of limitations of 28 
U.S.c. § 2462 apply to 26 U.S.c. § 6701. 
155. 273 U.S. 346 (1927). 
156. Id. at 350. 
157. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1977) (current version at 28 U.S.c. § 2462 (1988 & Supp. 
IV 1992». See also supra note 26 and accompanying text for provisions of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2462. See also supra note 10 and accompanying text for provisions of 26 U.S.c. 
§ 6701. 
158. The district court found the argument that the taxpayer has a right to be free 
from government interference after an acceptable period of time to be persuasive. Mul­
likin v. United States, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), 85,304 (E.D. Ky. 1990). 
159. S. REp. No. 363, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965), reprinted in 1965 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1826, 1832. See infra notes 170-181 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of the legislative history behind § 2462. 
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B. Critique of the Mullikin Majority's Analysis 
The Mullikin majority placed a great deal of emphasis on the 
doctrines established in E.l. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc. and 
Badaracco.16o However, the Mullikin majority failed to address a 
competing, contrary doctrine established by the Supreme Court in 
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.161 The Supreme Court in 
Rothensies found it irrational that an income tax system would 
never have a date at which the taxpayer would be free from arbi­
trary and capricious intervention by the government.162 The Roth­
ensies Court held that Congress did not intend for the IRS to be 
able to assess taxes at any time.163 Justice Jackson, speaking for the 
Court, stated, "a statute of limitation is an almost indispensable ele­
ment of fairness as well as of practical administration of an income 
tax policy."164 
Although there are no Courts of Appeals cases which have ap­
plied this doctrine in the context of statute of limitations and sec­
tion 6701, there is at least one district court case, Lamb v. United 
States,165 that has followed the Rothensies doctrine. The Lamb 
court held that Congress intended to subject section 6701 to the five 
year limitation period in section 2462 because to hold otherwise 
would be inequitable.166 However, the Mullikin majority failed to 
address the argument that persuaded the court in Lamb, though the 
majority did give a cursory explanation for the unfair policy results 
that would stem from its decision.167 The Mullikin majority stated: 
"It is not the duty of this Court to write statutes of limitations into 
statutes; rather, that is the duty of Congress."168 
However, Congress did write a statute of limitations for all ac­
tions commenced by the federal government. That limitation pe­
riod was enacted in section 2462. If the Mullikin majority had 
applied the statute of limitations set forth in section 2462, the ma­
160. Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 
S. Ct. 85 (1992); see supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text. 
161. 329 U.S. 296 (1946); see also supra notes 52-58. 
162. Id. at 301. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. 779 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Ark. 1991), rev'd, 977 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1992). 
166. Id. at 119. 
167. Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 929 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 
S. Ct. 85 (1992). "Although this may seem a harsh result, the result is in accordance 
with jurisprudence regarding the applicability of statutes of limitations to causes of ac­
tion in favor of the government." Id. 
168. Id. 
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jority only would have been applying an established statute of limi­
tations. It is illogical for Congress to have passed a statute which, 
by its own terms, applies to all actions commenced by the federal 
government, but to later have courts rule that they have no author­
ity to use such a statute on the reasoning that the courts would be 
writing unwarranted limitation periods into statutes. As seen by 
the legislative history of section 2462 and other judicial interpreta­
tion of section 2462, Congress wished to avoid results similar to 
Mullikin when it enacted section 2462.169 
C. 	 The Mullikin Majority Did Not Examine the Legislative 
History of Title 28, Section 2462 of the United States 
Code 
In 1966, Congress enacted title 28, section 2415 of the United 
States Code, which imposed time limitations on tort and contract 
law suits initiated by the government.170 In its report on section 
2415, the Senate judiciary Committee indicated the purpose of the 
section, as well as its view of statutes of limitations in general pI 
The Committee asserted that the purpose of statutes of limitations 
was to speed up litigation by unclogging the federal courtS.I72 The 
Committee also noted that time limitations ensure citizens a fair 
and equitable procedure when dealing with the federal govern­
ment.173 According to the report, the Committee also believed that 
statutes of limitations were necessary for a fair and just system of 
government.174 
In a specific reference to section 2462, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee noted that the newly enacted section 2415 would not 
affect any pre-existing time limitation periods.175 This was a signifi­
cant development because it showed a general Congressional intent 
to place greater time restrictions on the government. More impor­
tantly, the executive branch also agreed that it is good public policy 
to place time restraints on the federal government when it is initiat­
ing a law suit.176 The Office of the Comptroller General stated that, 
169. 	 Lamb, 779 F. Supp. at 119, rev'd, m7 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1992). 
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)-(g) (lm8) (current version at 28 U.S.c. § 2415(a)-(i) 
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992» (originally Pub. L. No. 89-505,80 Stat. 304 (1966». 
171. 	 S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502. 
172. 	 Id. at 2503. 
173. 	 Id. 
174. 	 Id. 
175. 	 Id. at 2509. 
176. 	 Both the Attorney General's and the Comptroller General's offices wrote 
204 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:181 
as an element of basic equity, time limitations were beneficial be­
cause the Comptroller General concluded individuals who deal with 
the government are entitled to protection when the actionable 
event took place many years earlier,117 The Senate Finance Com­
mittee weighed this factor heavily when it adopted section 2415.178 
The Mullikin majority failed to address the IRS's contention that 
penalty assessments were merely administrative acts and therefore 
outside the scope of section 2462. However, even if the Mullikin 
majority did hold that an assessment is only an administrative pro­
ceeding, the legislative history of section 2462 indicates that Con­
gress intended section 2462 to apply to administrative proceedings 
as well. 
Furthermore, in 1949 Congress passed the Export Control 
Act,119 In a 1965 report addressing amendments to the Export 
Control Act, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee stated 
that it intended the five year statute of limitations established in 
title 28, section 2462 of the United States Code to apply to proceed­
ings brought under the Act because the Act did not explicitly estab­
lish a limitations period. ISO More significantly, the Committee 
wrote that it intended section 2462 to apply to both judicial and 
administrative proceedings.18l It is therefore rational to conclude 
Congress intended section 2462 to apply in all penalty proceedings 
instituted by the government, regardless of any differentiation be­
tween purely administrative or judicial acts. Given the Congres­
letters advising the adoption of more statutes of limitation to be applied against the 
federal government. Letter from the Attorney General to the Vice President (Mar. 10, 
1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2512-14; Letter from Frank H. Weitzel, 
Assistant Comptroller General, to Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Committee 
on the Judiciary (Apr. 13, 1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2514. 
177. Letter from Frank H. Weitzel, Assistant Comptroller General to Hon. 
Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary (Apr. 13, 1966), re­
printed in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2514. 
178. S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2508. 
179. Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 87-515, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (current 
version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988». 
180. S. REP. No. 363, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965), reprinted in 1965 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1826, 1832. 
181. Id. at 1832. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee gave a candid 
report of § 2462 and its applicability to administrative acts. The report stated: 
It is intended that the general 5-year limitation imposed by section 2462 of 
title 28 shall govern. Under that section, the time is reckoned from the commis­
sion of the act giving rise to the liability, and not from the time of imposition of 
the penalty, and it is applicable to administrative as well as judicial proceedings. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
1994] FEDERAL TAX LAW-MULLIKIN v. UNITED STATES 205 
sional intent that section 2462 apply to all government penalty 
actions, a logical progression would be to examine how federal 
courts have applied section 2462. 
D. 	 Application of Title 28, Section 2462 of the United States 
Code by the Courts 
As an exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity 
from the running of statutes of limitations, courts have found the 
sovereign is not exempt under the federal statute of limitations for 
the imposition of civil fines and penalties.182 However, federal 
courts have only applied section 2462 to a narrow group of cases. 
The usual factual situation where federal courts have applied sec­
tion 2462 is an action that is a penalty or forfeiture proceeding 
brought on behalf of the government.183 
The federal courts have refused to expand the application of 
section 2462 outside these narrow interpretations. The courts have 
held that section 2462 will only apply if the penalty is imposed as a 
result of a violation of a public law and is penal in nature. Courts 
have never held the words "penalty, fine, or forfeiture" in section 
2462 to mean damages or compensation for injuries received, either 
in tort .or in contract.t84 Courts have interpreted the word "pen­
alty" to mean punishment for breaking a law.185 Still, even with 
such a narrow application of section 2462, courts have consistently 
182. See, e.g., United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (holding that 
the general rule is that the government is exempted from time limitations) (citations 
omitted); United States v. Weaver, 207 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding the gov­
ernment is generally immune to statutes of limitations; section 2462 is a specific excep­
tion to that general immunity). 
183. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915) (holding § 2462, pre­
viously § 791, does not apply to an action for damages brought under the Transporta­
tion Act); Bertha Building Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785, 788 n.5 (2d 
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960) (ruling § 2462 inapplicable in a suit for 
treble damages under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc. v. 
United States, 150 F. Supp. 561, 566 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (holding § 2462 does not apply to a 
suit by a contractor against the federal government). 
184. United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 313 (1960) (holding that when the 
government recovers under the Surplus Property Act, the recovery is not a "penalty" 
but is liquidated damages, therefore, § 2462 does not apply) (citations omitted); United 
States v. Perry, 431 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1970) (ruling that recovery under the 
Anti-Kickback Act is compensatory, not a penalty). 
185. Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 
(1906) (holding that a penalty or forfeiture in § 2462, formerly § 791, referred to some­
thing imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law); Meeker, 236 U.S. at 
423 (ruling that a penalty under § 2462 means the government wishes to punish the 
offender for violating a public law). 
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held that the limitations period is applicable unless it is clear that 
Congress did not intend the section to apply.186 
The factual circumstances disputed in Mullikin fit squarely into 
the fact paradigm that federal courts have established for the appli­
cation of section 2462. In Mullikin, there was (i) a penalty assessed 
for violation of federallaw;187 (ii) which was not intended to com­
pensate, but rather to punish and deter;188 and (iii) there is no clear 
legislative intent that section 2462 is to be ignored by the courts in 
dealing with section 6701 penalties.189 Thus, since neither the lan­
guage nor the legislative history of title 26, section 6701 of the 
United States Code provides a clear legislative directive not to ap­
ply title 28, section 2462 of the United States Code, courts should 
impose the five year limitations period established in section 2462 
to penalties assessed pursuant to title 26, section 6701 of the United 
States Code.190 The Mullikin majority either mistakenly, or pur­
posely, failed to address the legislative history behind section 2462. 
Had the Mullikin majority addressed the congressional intent and 
legislative history of section 2462, the case may have been decided 
in favor of the taxpayer. Instead, the Mullikin majority based its 
holding on conflicting authority established in several United States 
Supreme Court cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in Mullikin sought to advance anti-fraud policy 
goals by allowing the IRS to make penalty assessments without re­
gard to any time restraints. However, the reasoning of the decision 
in Mullikin was purely policy-driven and failed to address the policy 
concerns which support the taxpayer's position. The majority mis­
applied the legislative histpry of section 6701 and ignored the plain 
language of section 2462. The majority also ignored relevant 
I 
186. H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 819, 822 (1st Cir. 
1965) (holding statutes of Iimitati~>ns, such as § 2462, are not to be avoided unless that 
intent is "manifestly clear"). 
187. 26 U.S.c. § 6701 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.c. § 6701 (1988 & Supp. 
IV 1992». 
188. Id. See also supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
legislative purpose of § 6701. 
189. 26 U.S.c. § 2462 is silent on the issue of the applicability of a statute of 
limitations. Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 85 (1992), In the absence of a clear legislative intent that § 2462 is not to 
apply, the five year limitations period of § 2462 is to be imposed. H.P. Lambert Co., 
354 F.2d at 822. 
190. See supra note 154. 
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Supreme Court cases that would have enabled the taxpayer to re­
ceive a favorable interpretation of section 6701. In short, the Mulli­
kin majority ignored sound legal reasoning to reach an inequitable 
and unjust result. 
Edward 1. Carroll III 
